More of a dribble so far
Prior to the GDPR's entry into force in May this year, much was being said about the "inevitable" deluge of class actions likely to flood the UK court system as a result. Many justifications were put forward to support this theory, including that:
The goal of this article is not to cast doubt upon the theory and reasoning set out above, which still holds good; but, six months into the new GDPR regime, we are far from drowning in group litigation - and below we consider some of the factors why the arrival of the "tidal wave" may have been delayed.
1. ICO backlog
First, and perhaps foremost, any claimant law firm is going to be focussed on choosing the right case upon which to cut its teeth as to the UK court's attitude to data protection class actions. Informing this choice is likely to be a close study of decisions made by the ICO which are highly critical of a controller's actions/processes and which impacted a large number of data subjects. This is class action gold, as far as claimant firms are concerned, and it is worth waiting for "the one".
The problem with this is that the ICO is currently suffering the effects of extreme over-notification of data breaches. Indeed, at a conference in September, the Deputy Information Commissioner remarked "Some controllers are 'over-reporting': reporting a breach just to be transparent, because they want to manage their perceived risk or because they think that everything needs to be reported……". Consequently the ICO's resources are at full stretch and they are not yet therefore able to turn their attention to assessing reported breaches or issuing enforcement notices/penalties. To date, only one post-GDPR enforcement notice has been issued, against Canada-based AggregateIQ for its part in the Cambridge Analytica debacle.
This is not to say that claimant lawyers will back off entirely pending an ICO decision. There have, very recently, been certain breaches where, put bluntly, irrespective of the who-did-what-to-who analysis, the numbers simply work and make collective action irresistible. We discuss this further below.
2. Representative body challenges
Secondly, whilst Article 80 GDPR appears, on the surface, to be relatively simple, dig a little deeper into its wording and you soon run into difficulty. This Article purports to enable certain organisations to bring legal actions and, if appropriate, claim compensation on behalf of data subjects. However, there are a number of stipulations as to which organisations can take on this role. They must be not-for-profit: what if, for example, a representative body is established solely for the purpose of bringing a claim which receives investment from a litigation funder – as discussed below, naturally, funders will only be interested in a case precisely because there is a good chance for them to make profit. Where does this leave the representative body in relation to the "not-for-profit" requirement? Other stipulations, such as the need to have "statutory objectives which are in the public interest" and to be "active in the field of the protection of data subjects’ rights and freedoms" present further obstacles.
As mentioned above, Member States were given the option under Article 80(2) GDPR to allow representative bodies on an "opt-out" basis; that is, every affected data subject is deemed to be represented in the action unless and until they actively choose not to be. The UK government, however, has for the time being chosen not to enact this provision. Consequently, even once a representative body passes the many definitional tests set by Article 80(1), it still then faces the mammoth and time-consuming task of having to collect signatories to the claim.
In the UK, Section 168 of the Data Protection Act 2018 supplements the right to claim damages set out in Article 82 GDPR. On the author's reading of subsection (2)(a) of section 168, which refers to claims for damages brought by an Article 80 representative body, the UK government's intention is that such claims will probably still have to meet the criteria applied to the existing "representative action" mechanism set out in Part 19 of the Civil Procedure Rules 9 (the "CPR"). This interpretation is derived from the words "in accordance with the rules of court" in this subsection. If this is correct, then, essentially, a standing test will apply to Article 80 actions in the same way as they have been applied to Part 19 actions. The key measure for standing is whether or not the represented parties can all be said to have the "same interest in a claim", a common grievance and the relief sought must be of benefit to all. This test presents a significant procedural hurdle to getting representative actions off the ground. For many potential claimants/their advisers, the alternative mechanism of a Group Litigation Order (where the bar for joining claimants together is the slightly lower "claims which give rise to common or related issues of fact or law") is often therefore the preferred option, even though it can take longer to put the group structure and financing in place.
3. Existing collective action mechanisms require critical mass
Under the current UK CPR, there are two forms of collective action: group litigation orders, or a representative action. Irrespective of which form is adopted by claimants, all participants in the represented group need to have actively opted in. For a representative action under the CPR, therefore, you need to find a minimum of 2 claimants who will opt into proceedings. This differs from the US position, where a single claimant can represent the entire group, as the basis for representation is opt-out (i.e. everyone who falls within the group is deemed to be represented unless they actively opt out).
Consequently, in the UK, there is an administrative challenge involved in identifying and signing up willing litigants. This challenge is all the harder because, in reality, a group of 2 claimants will not usually cut the mustard. This is because of the high costs of collective litigation, which often necessitates the involvement of a professional litigation funding outfit. Due to the limits imposed under UK law on the recoverability of success fees, law firms are often reluctant to fund such actions themselves; and so litigation funders' resources are often called upon. Increasingly, in the world of data protection litigation, funders are showing interest – but they remain hesitant. There are two main reasons for this. First is the rule in the UK that the party who prevails in litigation is entitled to recover a proportion of its legal costs from the losing party. This significantly increases the risk associated with funding a class action, and so funders will be looking for cases where they assess their chances of success as more than likely. This is where the absence of ICO decisions on non-compliance with GDPR plays its part – such decisions will provide a useful starting point for claimant law firms to identify cases likely to attract the interest of litigation funding outfits.
Secondly, in order for a funding outfit to view data protection litigation as a worthwhile investment, there needs to be a critical mass of claimants signed up to it to render the potential damages pot large enough to merit the costs risk. To date, data protection damages awards have been relatively low (typically between £1,000-£10,000 per claimant). Where claims are brought purely in respect of non-material damage this seems likely to remain the case. Unlike in the US, punitive damages are only very rarely awarded in the UK, and currently we have only limited precedent of damages awards made against commercial organisations held liable for a data breach. We are awaiting the quantum judgment in the class action brought against Morrisons supermarket[1]; this will inform potential future group actions and, depending on the damages awarded, may encourage/discourage litigants and funders accordingly.
Finally, related to the required size of class and damages claimed, one recent decision by the UK courts has raised the question of whether there is now, at least in relation to claims brought against data controllers without an EU presence, a minimum threshold applicable before the courts will entertain a class action relating to data protection. In the judgment handed down in Lloyd v Google[2] last month, the judge appeared unimpressed by the amount of damages that each individual would receive, particularly once the percentage of damages reserved for payment of legal costs and return on the funder's investment was taken into account. This appears to have partially influenced his decision that the claim amounted to an abuse of process and his consequent refusal to permit the claimants to serve the claim form out of jurisdiction on Google. Whether this will crystallise into a threshold in all such compensation claims for non-material damage against non-EU entities (or indeed against those based within the EU as well), remains to be seen, but will certainly sound a warning shot to those considering class actions.
Will the floodgates remain closed?
So, can data controllers kick back and breathe a big sigh of relief, safe in the knowledge that the dam remains shored up against the threatened barrage of class actions? In short, no. There are a number of reasons why it remains advisable to prepare for the tidal wave, including:
Best tips for staying waterproof
If the spectre of class actions remains, what are the steps you can take to minimise the damage they could cause to your organisation? If you're handling large amounts of data, particularly in a consumer-facing environment, then sadly it's probably a case of when-not-if you face some sort of litigation threat, but that doesn't mean there aren't measures you can implement now that will allow you to be in an optimal position for responding to that threat when it comes. For example: