The highly anticipated Protection of Critical Infrastructures (Computer Systems) Bill (Bill) is finally gazetted. The publication of the Bill is a culmination of a series of public consultation earlier this year. The Bill provides much needed clarity and certainty as to how critical infrastructures and computer systems in Hong Kong should be regulated. Following our previous insight Are you ready for Hong Kong’s Cybersecurity law?, the purpose of this update focuses on the key aspects of the Bill, as well as a useful comparison of the Bill with the current cybersecurity regulatory landscape in Mainland China.
Critical Infrastructure (CI) |
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Critical Computer Systems (CCS) |
Designated computer systems (whether under the control of the operator or not) that are accessible in or from Hong Kong and are essential to the core function of a CI by CIO. This means only those systems expressly designated by the Commissioner of Critical Infrastructure (Computer-system Security) will be regulated by the Bill. |
Critical Infrastructure Operators (CIO) |
Designated operators which operate a Specified CI. |
The Bill introduces the concept of specified critical infrastructure (Specified CI) which was not previously covered in the public consultation. Put simply:
A CI is a Specified CI if:
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Importantly, this means the Commissioner has the discretion to designate any other infrastructure outside of the specified sectors currently prescribed under the Bill as a critical infrastructure, as long as the Commissioner is satisfied that its compromise may substantially affect critical societal or economic activities in Hong Kong.
Notably, the Bill draws reference from the relevant cybersecurity and critical infrastructure legislations in other jurisdictions. We juxtapose below a high-level comparison of fundamental aspects under the Bill and the Mainland China regime (Cybersecurity Law (2016) and Regulation for Safe Protection of Critical Information Infrastructure (2021) the “PRC position”), including definitions, scope of application, obligations and penalties for non-compliance.
HONG KONG |
PRC |
REMARKS |
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Definition of CI |
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Key similarities: Both definitions are very similar in scope, stressing specific sectors as well as the negative impact if such CI is compromised (e.g. suffering damage, loss of functionality or data leakage). |
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Subject of regulation |
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CI, CIO and CCS |
CI and CIO |
Key similarity: Both laws place primary obligations on CIOs Notable differences: The PRC position does not have a separate category for CCS and no express references to systems accessible in or from the jurisdiction. |
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Responsible Regulatory Authorities |
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Key authority: Commissioner of Critical Infrastructure (Computer-system Security) (Commissioner). Other currently designated authorities are the HKMA and CA. |
Key authority: Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC). Other authorities include public security departments and relevant departments of each important industry. |
Key similarity: Both laws establish a regulatory mechanism whereby a central key regulator is supported by other regulatory bodies. Comment: In line with majority respondents’ views, HKMA and CA are designated to regulate CIOs for Categories 1 and 2 obligations in their respective sectors, given their familiarity and capabilities. The Commissioner will regulate all sectors for Category 3 obligations. |
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Organisational Obligations (Category 1 Obligations) |
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Key similarities: Both laws require establishment of dedicated internal units and personnel to oversee network security, as well as notification requirements regarding certain types of operator changes. |
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Preventive Obligations (Category 2 Obligations) |
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In relation to computer system:
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Key similarities: Both laws require internal cybersecurity plans or policies in place, and periodical cybersecurity protective practices (the results of which must be submitted to the regulators). Notable difference: In contrast to the Bill, the PRC position does not specifically prescribe an audit requirement.
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Incident Reporting and Response Obligations (Category 3 Obligations) |
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Key similarities: Both laws contain similar incident reporting and response obligations. Notable difference: The Bill is more prescriptive for the timing of incident reporting. Comment: To strike a balance between regulatory aims and respondents’ concerns, the Bill relaxes the timing for reporting serious incidents (from 2 hours to 12 hours) and other incidents (from 24 hours to 48 hours). |
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Penalties for Non-Compliance |
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In general:
*Failure to notify operator changes is subject to HKD 3 M – 5 M. |
Depending on the offence in question, the penalties typically range between RMB 100,000 – 1,000,000. |
Comment: The maximum fines set out in the Bill largely align with the initial proposal by the Government in July 2024, despite respondents’ concerns that the fines are excessive. |
According to the consultation report published by the Government, the CIOs and CCSs are expected to be designated in a progressive and phased manner. As an action point, the existing infosec and cybersecurity framework would serve as a good starting point for organisations to ensure compliance with the three categories of obligations by consolidating and configuring existing operating and response procedures.
It should be noted that while the primary responsibility under the Bill is placed on CIOs to comply with various obligations, the CIOs must also ensure that their computer systems that are accessible in or from Hong Kong (whether or not under the control of the operator) comply with the requirements under the Bill. In practice, CIO and CI customers will be expected to review existing supplier contractual relationships in light of the Bill to ensure sufficient and robust contractual rights are provided, such as compensatory, audit, termination rights and service level assurances. This is similar to the relationship between data users and data processors under the Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) (e.g. how data users are responsible for the acts and omissions of data processors).
On the other hand, third party service providers (e.g. IT, cloud or outsourcing service providers) should expect a degree of ‘indirect regulation’ when CIO or CI customers seek to ‘flow down’ their statutory obligations under the Bill. Several respondents have expressed concerns over CIOs’ liabilities over third party service providers (particularly foreign service providers) in the public consultation, but the position has been retained in the Bill, with further provisions and guidelines on “due diligence” performance and “reasonable endeavor” to be included in subsequent Codes of Practices. In this light, given the similarities between the Bill and the PRC position, for suppliers providing cross-jurisdictional service arrangements to CIO or CI customers, it remains to be seen whether a market practice will emerge to harmonise suppliers’ critical infrastructure obligations across these two jurisdictions.
In conclusion, the Bill marks a significant step forward in enhancing Hong Kong’s cybersecurity framework by clearly defining CI and CCS, and outlining the responsibilities of CIOs. The Bill also aligns Hong Kong with global cybersecurity trends and reinforces Hong Kong’s commitment to protecting its critical infrastructures in an increasingly interconnected world. From a compliance perspective, similarities between the Hong Kong and PRC positions in this regard could make a useful case for harmonised approach, but in any event operators and service providers alike should keep an eye out on further clarity and future guidelines and codes of practices we will continue to see in the near future.